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Abstract: This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a 
method of election which is a new theory in social choice where voters judge candidates instead of ranking 
them. The paper emphasize on the works of Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki majority judgment in an 
election. In Arrow’s impossibility theorem of social choice theory, the voters have to give a strictly 
preference ordering over the alternatives and hence they can not express indifference of the candidates. In 
the process of majority judgment the voters can express much more information than the Arrow’s process 
does but it is not free from counter-intuitive results. The Borda majority count avoids some counter-
intuitive results and an attempt has been taken here to highlight them. The paper discusses both the 
advantages and drawbacks of the majority judgment in an election. Sometimes tie arises in majority 
judgment and different processes of tie-breaking are discussed with theoretical and mathematical 
calculations. 
 
Keywords: Majority voting, drawbacks in majority voting, manipulation of voting.  
 
Introduction 
     Elections are the mechanisms expressing for the wishes of individuals into a decision 
of the society. In the whole world the choice of one candidate from a set of candidates is 
performed by elections. In the elections voters can compare the candidates which one is 
better for them and finally make the list of preferences in their minds and apply their 
opinions through the elections. In the modern world there are many voting methods such 
as Condorcet voting, Borda voting, plurality voting, the single transferable voting, 
approval voting etc. The great mathematician Laplace first proposed to judge the 
candidates in two centuries ago (Laplace 1820) and asked the voters not to compare but 
to evaluate the competitors by assigning points according to the merits of the candidates. 
Laplace suggested the range [0, R] where R is a positive integer. Usually values of R be 0, 
1, 2, 5, 10 or 100. Here R = 1 indicates approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1983) and R 
= 100 is the range voting introduced by Smith (Smith 2007). 
      In Arrow’s impossibility theorem in social choice theory, the voters have to give a 
strictly performance ordering over the alternatives and hence they can not express 
indifference of the candidates. But in majority judgment voting scope is given to the 
voters to evaluate the candidates in some common grading system. Hence by the process 
of majority judgment voting the voters can express much more information than the 
Arrow’s process does. Borda voting is one kind of majority judgment voting where voters 
can express their opinion by ranking the candidates.  
     Written evidence of voting is found since 1299 which is introduced by Ramon Llull 
(H a&& gele and Pukelsheim 2001). From that time it is seen that candidates are elected and 
ranked according to compare the relative merits of the candidates. A rule of voting is 
strategy-proof when every voter’s best strategy is his true preference-order, otherwise it 
is manipulable.  
     French political philosophers Borda (1781) and Condorcet (1785) introduced modern 
voting system but they had not mentioned about manipulation of voting. Condorcet, 
Borda and even many modern politicians believe that elections are logically imperfect. In 
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this paper majority judgment is discussed in very simple but in a detailed manner. Voting 
system is directly involved with economics, political science and social science. So that if 
one has no proper knowledge of the voting system then he can not serve the society in 
proper way and cannot expect the economic development of the society. In this paper we 
have discussed aspects of majority voting by introducing elections of French and USA. 
We have cited few examples and propositions with proof to make the paper easier to the 
readers.  
 
Practical Experience of the Voting Result 
   To implement a voting system politicians face various difficulties. Hence every voting 
system has some drawbacks. Among the various drawbacks first we consider two voting 
paradoxes as follows: 
Condorcet’s paradox: Let us assume that there are 17 voters of three types and three 
alternatives x, y, and z. Let preference relations be as follows: 
    Type 1: xPyPz     by 8 voters, 
    Type 2: yPzPx     by 5 voters, 
    Type 3: zPxPy     by 4 voters. 
In an election a vote between x and y, x collects 8+4 =12 votes and y collects 5 votes, 
so that x wins. Again a vote between y and z, y collects 8+5 =13 votes and z collects 4 
votes, so that y wins. Again a vote between x and z, x collects 8 votes and z collects 4+5 
=9 votes, so that z wins. We observe that there is a cycle in the voting results where x is 
defeated by y, y is defeated by z and also z is defeated by x which is a (Condorcet’s) 
voting paradox. 
    This type of paradox is not often seen but it is observed in a Danish election (Kurrild-
Klitgaard 1999). In 1976 Judgment of Paris where eleven voters which are well known 
wine experts, evaluated six Cabernet-Sauvignons of California and four of Bordeaux. By 
the Condorcet’s majority principle, five wines including three of the four French wines 
all preferred to the other five wines by a majority judgment, where it is judges such a way 
that the output becomes xIyPzIuPvPx, which is a Condorcet cycle. Here for wines x, y 
and z we mean: xIy, x is indifferent to y and yPz, y is strictly preferred to z. 
Arrow’s paradox: Let there are at least three candidates x, y, and z. Suppose in an 
election x wins when these three candidates are competitors. If any weaker candidate 
between y and z, say z withdraws then y may defeats x. This type of paradox is introduced 
by Arrow and is called Arrow’s paradox. 
     Arrow’s paradox is seen in the US presidential election of 2000. In the first-past-the-
post system the winner may change for the present or absent of irrelevant candidates 
which is a common situation in most of the countries of the world. In the US president 
election of 2000 that type of situation aroused. In that election two main competitors 
were George W. Bush and Albert Gore, and Ralph Nader was a candidate who has no 
chance of winning. But the presence of Ralph Nader changes the election outcome (table-
1). 
                         Table 1: The US presidential election of 2000. 
Candidate National vote Electoral College Florida vote 
George W. Bush 50,456,002 271 2,912,790 
Albert Gore 50,999,897 266 2,912,253 
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Ralph Nader 2,882,955 0 97,488 
The total national vote was in favor of Gore but in Florida Nader casts 26 electoral votes 
which alone change the winner in the US election of 2000. Because it is estimated that if 
Nader remained absent in Florida election most of his 97,488 votes would have gone to 
Gore who had 537 votes less than Bush, obviously Gore would have won. In the majority 
judgment there is no chance of changing election outcome.  
 
French Presidential Election of 2007 
   There were 12 candidates in 2007 French president election. In that election voters did 
not apply majority judgment, instead they chose one of their best preferred candidates. 
The total number of registered voters was 44.5 millions and 84% of these voters took part 
in the election of both rounds. The results of the 12 candidates after the first round are 
given in table-2. 
                    Table 2: French presidential election, first round, April 22, 2007. 
N.Sarkozy       
31.18% 
S. Royal 
25.87% 
F. Bayrou 
18.57% 
J.-M. Le Pen 
10.44% 
O. Besancenot 
4.08% 
P. de Villiers 
2.23% 
M.-G. Buffet 
1.93% 
D. Voynet 
1.57% 
A. Laguiller 
1.33% 
J. Bov´e 
1.32% 
F. Nihous 
1.15% 
G. Schivardi 
0.34% 
After the first round four candidates Bayrou, Sarkozy, Royal and Le Pen survived for the 
second round. In 2007 voters were acutely aware of the importance of who would have 
survived in the first round. In the second round Sarkozy defeated Royal by 18,983,138 
(53.06%) to 16,790,440 (46.94%). If we follow Condorcet or Borda rule we would find 
the different results. The results of polls, on 28 March and 19 April, 2007 of potential 
second round are given in table-3. By Condorcet method Bayrou was the Condorcet 
winner, since he would have defeated all other candidates in pairwise contests. 
        Table 3: 28 March and 19 April, 2007, potential second round Polls. 
 Bayrou Sarkozy Royal Le Pen 
Bayrou –           – 54%     55% 57%     58% 84%       80% 
Sarkozy 46%     45%    –           – 54%     51% 84%       84% 
Royal 43%     42%  46%     49% –           – 75%       73% 
Le Pen 16%     20%  16%     16% 25%     27% –             – 
From table-3 we see that there is no Condorcet cycle. Final result: Bayrou is first, 
Sarkozy is second, Royal is third and Le Pen is fourth. Now we use Borda rule to obtain 
the Borda score from table-3. On 28 March the Borda scores were as follows: Bayrou 
195, Sarkozy 184, Royal 164, and Le Pen 57. On 19 April those were as follows: Bayrou 
193, Sarkozy 180, Royal 164, and Le Pen 63. According to both Condorcet and Borda 
methods Bayrou was the winner in the French 2007 election. 
    In 1907 Sir Francis Galton (Galton 1907) realized that point-summing methods do not 
elicit honesty. He expressed that when a jury is to decide on an amount of money, for 
example, to allocate to a project, or in assessing damages in an insurance claim—“that 
conclusion is clearly not the average of all the estimates, which would give a voting 
power to ‘cranks’ in proportion to their crankiness” (Balinski and Laraki 2010b). In a 
voting an aggregation must be meaningful both in social-grading and social-ranking 
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functions. To manipulate a voting successfully a voter must be able to raise or to lower a 
candidate’s final grade by changing the grade she assigns. Voters who can both lower and 
raise the final grade have a much greater possibility of manipulation. Voting outcome 
will heed the majority’s will. In an election where there are many voters and a language 
of relatively few grades the two middlemost order functions will have one value which is 
the majority grade. 
    Hence from the above discussion we can say that a voting system must fulfill the 
following six demands (Balinski and Laraki 2010b): 
• avoid Condorcet’s paradox, 
• avoid Arrow’s paradox, 
• be meaningful, 
• elicit honest voting, 
• resist manipulation, and 
• pay attention to the majority’s will. 
To fulfill above requirements we feel the importance of the majority judgment voting 
system, which is described as follows: 
 
Majority Judgment Voting 
     In Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1963, Islam et al. 2009a,b, 2011) preference 
relation xPy for individual 1 and individual 2 express same preferences where x and y are 
two candidates. But in majority voting xPy may give different results. Suppose in 
majority Judgment voting both of the individuals’ preference is xPy. Individual 1 
expresses x is Good and y is Rejected. On the other hand individual 2 expresses x is 
Excellent and y is Very Good. This type of situation frequently happens in the society. 
We see that this gives more accurate information of the voters’ opinion. Balinski and 
Laraki (2006, 2007, 2010a,b) first have introduced this type of judgment which is the 
median values of the grades given to a candidate is taken as the final grade of that 
alternative. They argue that an individual should choice the middlemost aggregation 
functions and call the resulting system majority judgment. 
     Let a finite set of m candidates is defined by { }mcccC ,...,, 21=  and a finite set of n 
voters is defined by { }nvvvV ,...,, 21= . Let { }kgggG ,...,, 21=   be the set of grades where 
kggg >>> ...21 . Here j
maji
gg ≥ means that ig  is the higher grade than jg  or ji gg = . An 
input profile is m×n  matrix ( )ijg  of grades where each row i contains the grades provide 
by the voters to candidate ic  and each column j contains the grades vector jv  assign to 
the different candidates. A social grading function F is defined by mnm GGF →×:  such 
that (Zahid and Swart 2010); 
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That is ( ) ( ) ( )( )mmajmaj cfcfaF ,...,1= , where ( )imaj cf  is the majority grade which is the 
median value of the candidate ic . 
     The thk  order function kf indicates an n-tuple of grades and supplies an output the 
thk  highest grade (Balinski and Laraki 2007). When the number of voters is odd, the 
majority grade is the median. If the number of voters is even, then the lower of the two 
middle grades must be the majority grade. Let a be the number of grades is given to a 
candidate above its majority grade θ  and b be the number of grades is given to a 
candidate below its majority grade θ . Hence we can write the majority grade *θ  as 
follows:                              
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Balinski and Laraki (2006) suggested that for even n, the lower of the two middle grades 
must be the majority grade. Hence a competitor’s majority grade is defined briefly as 
follows: 
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  US Presidential Election of 2008 
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      Within the last six weeks of the US presidential election of 2008, member of the 
INFORMS were invited to vote using the grades in September – early October, 2008. The 
results are given in table-4. Suppose we have six grades: Reject, Poor, Acceptable, Good, 
Very Good and Excellent to vote in grading system. We express these six grades in 
simple notations as: R, P, A, G, VG and E. 
   The majority grades and majority ranking of the results of table-4 are given in table-5. 
Here Bloomberg and Edwards have the same majority grade A+. Bloomberg with a = 
42.0% ranks than Edwards with a = 36.6%. From tables -4 and -5 we see that Obama is 
the winner in the majority judgment. 
 
Table 4: US presidential election, INFORMS experiment, conducted September-early 
October, 2008. 
 E V G G A P R 
Obama 35.9% 32.1% 12.2% 08.4% 07.6% 03.8% 
Clinton 16.0% 29.0% 21.4% 16.8% 11.5% 05.3% 
Powell 10.7% 22.1% 26.0% 26.7% 09.2% 22.1% 
Bloomberg 03.1% 14.5% 24.4% 26.7% 09.2% 22.1% 
Edwards 01.5% 13.0% 22.1% 30.5% 18.3% 14.5% 
McCain 03.1% 07.6% 23.7% 21.4% 30.5% 13.7% 
Romney 00.8% 07.6% 10.7% 27.5% 30.5% 22.9% 
Huckabee 03.8% 03.8% 06.1% 19.8% 19.1% 47.3% 
 
 
Table 5: Majority-grades and majority-ranking, U.S. presidential election, INFORMS   
experiment, conducted September-early October, 2008. 
 a θ  b 
Obama 35.9%  V G + 32.0% 
Clinton 45.0%  G + 33.6% 
Powell 32.8%  G − 41.2% 
Bloomberg 42.0%  A + 31.3% 
Edwards 36.6%  A + 32.8% 
McCain 33.4%  A − 44.2% 
Romney 46.6%  P + 22.9% 
Huckabee 33.5%  P − 47.3% 
 
Advantages of Majority Judgment 
      Majority judgment election has some advantages from other voting systems. Few of 
them are as follows:     
• It respects the election outcome of the majority. The majority grade (will be 
discussed later) is the unique mechanism which guarantees that when a majority 
of the electorate gives a grade g to a candidate, then that candidate’s majority 
grade will be g. If everyone of a majority can give a point score of s to a candidate 
but that candidate’s majority will certainly not be s. 
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• It satisfies transitive rule. Transitivity implies that for three candidates 21,cc  and 
3c   if 21 cc
maj
>  and 32 cc
maj
>  then we must have 31 cc
maj
> . The Condorcet paradox 
shows that the Condorcet voting is not transitive (Islam et al. 2011).  
• It satisfies independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). IIA means that the rank 
order of two candidates is not influenced by the third one.  
• It satisfies monotone. If every grade of a candidate is replaced by the same or a 
better grade, the candidate’s place in the majority ranking cannot be lower. If 
every grade of a candidate is replaced by a strictly better grade, the candidate’s 
majority grade must be raised. Monotonicity is not satisfied by the single 
transferable vote.  
• It satisfies voters’ utilities.  In theory the motivations of voters and their 
satisfaction are modeled by their utilities. Given the decision mechanism and 
whatever information that is available, a rational voter chooses a message that 
maximizes her utility. 
• It has freedom of expression of opinion of the candidates. Some critics have 
claimed that a voter should be forced to make up her mind by expressing a clear 
cut preference between any two candidates. But in majority judgment it is 
impossible.  
• It does not satisfy dictatorship. In a society if the voters prefers x to y, society 
must prefer x to y, irrespective of the preferences else. This is called the condition 
of non-dictatorship. Mathematically, there is no such individual i, Xyx ∈∀  ,  
such that xPyyxPi ⇒  where X is a set of candidates. The dictatorship is 
undesirable in the society. First, it is undesirable because one’s worst enemy 
might be dictator. Second, it is not a collective choice rule. So that dictatorship 
may cause the violation of human rights. 
• In majority judgment every vote of all the voters must count. If two friends with 
opposite opinions sometimes skip voting because they think that their votes 
cancel each other outcome. Actually this is a wrong decision of voters in majority 
judgment. Their votes of course would effect if they would attend in the election. 
• Every grade contributes to the determination of the majority ranking, even when a 
voter gives the same grade to every candidate. Again whatever may be a voter’s 
grade (whatever may be the grades of a group of voters), there exists a situation 
where the voter (the group of voters) is decisive. This means that counting the 
voter’s (the group of voters’) ballot(s) gives one outcome; not counting it (them) 
gives another outcome. 
• It reduces manipulation of voting. 
 
The Majority Count of Borda  
     The Borda rule (Borda 1781) belongs to the class of point ranking rules where points 
are given to each candidate or alternative according to his rank in the preference of the 
voters. In this method if there are n alternatives, an elector’s first choice is assigned 
( )1−m  points, his second ( )2−m  points and so on down to his last choice, which is 
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assigned 0 point. Once all votes have been counted and the candidate with the most 
points is the winner. 
    The majority count of Borda is a function ( ) mnm NGaM →×:  which assigns to any 
profile the output ( ) ( )( )mcMcM ,...,1 , where ( )icM  is the majority count of Borda of 
candidate ic . Let ‘c’ be a candidate and let { }kgggG ,...,, 21=   be the set of grades where 
kggg <<< ...21 . Let iv  be the number of voters, then the Borda majority count (M) can 
be defined by; 
                                   ( ) ( )1...10 21 −×++×+×= kvvvcM k                                      
                                            = ( )∑
=
−×
k
i
i iv
1
1 .                                                             (2) 
We assign 0 point to the R grade, 1 point to the P grade, 2 points to the A grade, 3 points 
to the G grade, 4 points to the VG grade, and 5 points to the E grade. Hence this system is 
the Borda count.  
Example 1: Suppose some journalists of a daily news paper of the USA want to survey 
randomly 1,000,000 people in each state to evaluate the popularity of the current 
president and the leader of the opposition party. The journalists can give each person a 
ballot paper with six grades: Reject, Poor, Acceptable, Good, Very Good and Excellent. 
The journalists can provide each person a ballot paper as follows: 
Table 6: The Borda majority count ballot paper 
 E VG G A P R 
The present president of USA       
The opposition leader of the USA       
The people vote with tick marks in all of the six grades or less than the six grades or even 
put tick in any one grade or none for two candidates and the journalists can collect all the 
ballot papers. Then the journalists can calculate the percentage of each grade by the 
Borda score mentioned above and easily can be expressed the popularity of the current 
president and the leader of the opposition party of the USA, and can express the results in 
that daily news paper.    
                                                    
Tie-Breaking in Majority Judgment          
   The general majority ranking  
maj
>  between two competitors ic  and jc is determined as 
follows: 
• If ( ) ( )jmajimaj cfcf > , then  j
maji
cc > . 
• If ( ) ( )jmajimaj cfcf = , then we drop one majority grade from the grades of each 
competitor. 
If the tie is not broken then the procedure is repeated step by step, by dropping grades 
from lower to higher until we receive a winner between ic  and jc . Now we set an 
example related to this type of tie-breaking as follows: 
Example 2:  Let there are two candidates x and y. They make tie in an election and the 
tie-breaking procedures are given as follows: 
                        Table 7a: Tie-breaking by the majority judgment. 
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 a E VG G A P R b Total 
x 37 19 18 24 2 17 20 39 100 
y 36 17 19 25 20 15 4 39 100 
 In the example-2, both x and y have the majority grades at G. The type of tie is −G . 
According to simple tie-breaking case the majority value of x is ( )39,,37 −G  and for y is 
( )39,,36 −G . Since 37>36, obviously x is the majority judgment winner in the election. 
Now we apply the general tie-breaking rule for the example-2. First we drop the E grades 
and then we obtain the table-7b from table-7a as follows: 
             Table 7b: First step of tie-breaking by the majority judgment. 
 a VG G A P R b Total 
x 18 18 24 2 17 20 39 81 
y 19 19 25 20 15 4 39 83 
Hence from table-7b we see that the majority value of x is ( )39,,18 −G  and for y is 
( )39,,19 −G . Since 19>18, obviously y is the majority winner in the general tie-breaking 
rule. 
     In the case of large elections Balinski and Laraki (2007) introduce another type of tie 
breaking rule. Candidate’s three majority values are sufficient to determine the 
candidate’s position in the majority ranking as follows: 
                 ( )ba ,,θ  where 





=
=
=
. grademajority   thebelow grades ofnumber  the
and grade,majority 
grade,majority   theabove grades ofnumber   the
b
a
θ  
The order between two majority values is defined as follows: 
          ( ) ( )dcba
maj
,,,,
** ϕθ >  if ** ϕθ
maj
> , where ** ϕθ >  if ϕθ >  and −+ >> θθθ 0 . 
If ** ϕθ =  then  ( ) ( )dcba
maj
,,,,
++ > ϕθ  if    
,  if 


<=
>
dbca
ca
 
                   and  ( ) ( )dcba
maj
,,,,
−− > ϕθ  if  



>=
>
,  if catb
tb
 
                   and ( ) ( )dcba
maj
,,,,
00 ϕθ >  if  a < c where a = b and c = d. 
Now we set an example related to this type of tie-breaking for a large election as follows: 
Example 3: Let us consider an election where there are two candidates x and y, and 
1259617 voters. The results are given in table-8. 
               Table 8: Second step of tie-breaking by the majority judgment. 
 a E VG G A P R b total 
x 361572 158976 202596 698760 100000 91485 7800 199285 1259617 
y 361572 162848 198724 445320 240034 104742 8949 353725 1259617 
Hence from table-8 we see that there is a tie in G+. The majority value of x is ( )199285,,361572 +G  and for y is ( )353725,,361572 +G . Since 353725>199285, 
according to Balinski and Laraki (2007) the winner in the election is y but according to 
the general tie-breaking rule the winner is x (Balinski and Laraki 2006). From the above 
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examples we observe that in majority tie-breaking winner in the election depends on 
which method is followed in the tie-breaking process. 
 
Tie-Breaking in Borda Majority Count              
     Sometimes there is a tie in M, and then the tie can be broken by dropping the R grade 
and re-calculating for the M. Again if the tie arises in this case the P grade must be 
dropped and re-calculate for the M. This process is continue by dropping grades step by 
step from lower to higher until the tie is broken. The candidate, who acquires the greatest 
M, is the Borda majority winner. The following example shows the procedures of tie 
breaking in M (Zahid and Swart 2010): 
 
Example 4: Let us consider 100 judges who give their judgments for three candidates 
21,cc  and 3c  as in the table-9 below: 
 
                                         Table 9: Tie Breaking in M.     
 E VG G A P R M-1 M-2 M-3 
1c  11 33 21 29 2 4 310 214 120 
2c  13 34 18 24 7 4 310 214 125 
3c  13 29 22 31 1 4 310 214 119 
In the table-9 we see that all the three candidates with Borda score 310 tied in M-1. 
Hence we drop the R grades of all the candidates and then re-calculate for M but same 
condition arises in M-2. At this situation we drop the P grades of all the candidates and 
after re-calculating for M we observe that now tie breaks and candidate 2c  with highest 
score 125 wins in the election. 
 
Drawbacks in Majority Judgment Voting 
     No voting method is stainless, so that majority judgment voting also has some 
counter-intuitive results. Some drawbacks of majority judgment voting are discussed with 
some examples as follows: 
Example 5: In majority judgment sometimes the winner may loose. Consider there are 
1000 voters, and two candidates x and y. Voters rank the two candidates as in the 
following table-10. 
                                      Table 10: Majority judgment. 
 a E VG G A P R b total 
x 500 200 300 500 0 0 0 0 1000 
y 510 200 310 200 160 70 60 290 1000 
Here the majority grade of x and y are +G . The majority value of x is ( )0,,500 +G  and the 
majority value of y is ( )290,,510 +G . According to both tie-breaking rules y is the winner. 
Here no voter gives x lower grade than G but 290 voters do the job for y. Here y is the 
winner because 10 extra voters vote VG to y and not taking into account the 290 voters 
evaluate y as lower than G. Here x’s performances are G or better than G and y’s 
performances are not so but according to majority voting y wins. If we consider non-
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majority judgment voting system then obviously x would win. Hence in majority 
judgment voting winner may loose. 
Example 6: In majority judgment sometimes looser may be the majority judgment 
winner. Now we consider a 100 round competitive contest where four players x, y, z, and 
w are competitors. They play 100 rounds and one judge gives them grades as follows: 
                                    Table 11: Majority judgment. 
 a E VG G A P R b 
x 50 20 10 20 0 0 50 0 
y 50 0 30 10 10 0 50 0 
z 50 0 10 10 20 10 50 0 
w 0 0 0 0 0 70 30 30 
At the first sight we can say that w is the looser and x is the winner because x performs 
five times G or better than G and w performs 0 in A or better than A. But according to 
Balinski and Laraki (2006, 2007) the lower majority middle grade be the majority grade. 
The majority grade of x, y, and z is R but the majority grade of w is P, so that w is the 
majority judgment winner. Hence in majority judgment voting sometimes looser may be 
the majority judgment winner.  
Example 7: In two cities electoral cases majority judgment violates both winner 
consistency and rank consistency. First we consider the following example with 
candidates x and y, and the set of grades be {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. 
For city-I 
                                             Table 11a: Majority judgment for city-I. 
Candidates Scores Majority grades 
x 6         4         3         1        0 3 
y 6         6         2         2        0 2 
In city-I, yx
maj
> , and x is ranked above y, so that x wins in the election. 
For city-II 
                                              Table 11b: Majority judgment for city-II. 
Candidates Scores Majority grades 
x 6         6         5         1        0 5 
y 6         5         4         4        1 4 
                                                                              
In city-II, yx
maj
> , and x is ranked above y, so that x wins in the election. Now combining 
the scores of two cities we get; 
 
                   Table 11c: Majority judgment of combination of city-I and city-II. 
Candidates Scores Majority grades 
x 6      6      6      5      4      3     1     1    0    0 3 
y 6      6      6      5      4      4     2     2    1    0 4 
In the combination of two cities elections, xy
maj
> , and y is ranked above x, so that y wins 
in the two cities combination elections. 
Example 8: If we add same number of voters in R (Rejected) then election result change. 
Consider an example with 15 voters as follows: 
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                                                Table 12a: Majority judgment. 
 a E VG G A P R b 
x 4 1 3 8 2 1 0 3 
y 3 1 2 10 1 1 0 2 
In table-12a the majority value of x is ( )3,,4 +G  and the majority value of y is ( )2,,3 +G . 
Since majority value is yx
maj
> , so that x wins in the election. Now we add two voters who 
vote in R, hence table-12a now becomes as follows: 
                           Table 12b: Majority judgment by adding 2 voters in R. 
 a E VG G A P R b 
x 4 1 3 8 2 1 2 5 
y 3 1 2 10 1 1 2 4 
Now majority value of x is ( )5,,4 −G  and the majority value of y is ( )4,,3 −G . Since 
majority value is xy
maj
> , so that y wins in the election by Balinski and Laraki (2007). 
Example 9: In an election two friends A and B have different opinions. A supports 
candidate x and B supports candidate y. The set of grades be {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. Voter A 
decided to give the highest grade 6 to x and second highest grade 5 to y. Voter B decided 
to give the highest grade 6 to y and second highest grade 5 to x. Both of them think their 
votes will give no fruitful result, so that they decided not to cast their votes. First we 
consider the example due to Bishop (2010). In the election there are two candidates x and 
y, and their scores are as follows:  
                                    Table 13a: Majority judgment by Bishop. 
Candidates Scores Majority grades 
x 1        2        4        4       6 4 
y 2        3        3        6       6 3 
Here yx
maj
> , so that x wins in the election. Now we apply this result for the case of voters 
A and B. If they would have vote then adding their votes to the table-13a of Bishop we 
get as follows:  
                   Table 13b: Majority judgment if two opposite voters would vote. 
Candidates Scores Majority grades 
x 1     2      4      4     5     6     6      6 4 
y 2     3      3      5     6     6     6      6 5 
From the table-13b above we see that xy
maj
> , and  y wins in the election. In Bishop’s 
example if both A and B votes 6 grade for x and 5 grade for y. The voting situation 
becomes as follows: 
             Table 13c: Majority judgment if two voters would vote in same grade. 
Candidates Scores Majority grades 
x 1        2        4        4       6       6 4 
y 2        3        3        5       5       6   5 
Here we observe that xy
maj
> , and  y is winner in the  election. This result is the same in 
the following two cases:  
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• If both A and B be with opposite grades supporters but absent in the election. 
• If both supporters A and B give the highest rank to x. 
This is a drawback of majority judgment voting. 
 
Theoretical Properties of the Majority Judgment and Borda Count 
     The majority grade of a candidate is her median grade. It is simultaneously the highest 
grade approved by a majority and the lowest grade approved by a majority. The winner 
consistency of an electorate is defined as follows: If there are two separate districts of an 
electorate and a candidate wins in both electorates, then he must wins in the combinations 
of the two districts. 
Proposition 1: Majority judgment voting is not winner consistent. 
Proof: Let there are two candidates x and y. The elections are held in two cities. Let in 
city-I majority judgment gives yx
maj
> , so that x wins in the election. Again let in city-II 
majority judgment gives the same result i.e., x is also winner here. If we combine the two 
cities according to Balinski and Laraki (2010a) we observe that xy
maj
>  always. So that y 
wins in the combination of two cities election. In example-9 we have obtained the same 
result. Hence majority judgment voting is not winner consistent. Q.E.D. 
 
The majority ranking orders the candidates according to their majority grades. The rank 
consistency of an electorate is defined as follows: If there are two separates cities of an 
electorate and the ranking of two candidates x, y in two cities of a consistency are yx > , 
then in the whole electorate the ranking of the candidates will be the same, that is yx >  
and x is the winner.  
Proposition 2: Majority judgment voting is not ranking consistent. 
Proof: Let there is an election in two separate districts A and B, and there are two 
candidates x and y. Assume in district A majority judgment gives yx > , i.e., x is ranked 
above y in the election, consequently x wins in the election. Again let in district B 
majority judgment gives the same result i.e., x is ranked above y in the election here. If 
we combine the two districts’ outcomes according to Balinski and Laraki (2010a) we 
observe that xy >  always i.e., y is ranked above x in the election, consequently y wins in 
the election. Hence ranks of x higher in both separate districts but y is ranked above x in 
the combination of two districts election. Hence majority judgment voting is not ranking 
consistent. Q.E.D. 
 
The grade consistency in majority judgment is defined as follows: If there are two 
separate towns of an electorate and the majority grade of a candidate in each town is θ , 
then the majority grade of the whole electorate will be θ  always. 
Proposition 3: Grade consistency is satisfied by the majority judgment. 
Proof: Let there is an election in two separate towns P and Q, and there are two 
candidates x and y. According to Balinski and Laraki (2010a) let the majority grade of x 
in town P be θ . In another town Q the majority grade of x also be θ . Then the majority 
grade of x in the combination of P and Q must be θ . Q.E.D. 
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The Borda majority count has no so many drawbacks as the majority judgment has. It 
also contradicts the propositions -1 and -2. So that it is winner and rank consistent. Hence 
we see that even in the 21st century politicians can not present a voting system which is 
better than the 18th centurion politicians Condorcet and Borda provided. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
     This paper analyzes the majority judgment, and its advantages and drawbacks with 
some examples. The theoretical properties of the majority judgment are described with 
some propositions. Some examples and related tables are included to show the aspects of 
the majority judgment in some detail. In this paper additionally we have also included 
Borda majority count to enrich the majority judgment. We have shown that majority 
judgment voting is not winner and rank consistent but the Borda majority count does not 
do so. Balinski and Laraki (2006) first introduced the majority judgment to avoid the 
problems of Arrow’s theorem in social choice theory but it created some paradoxes 
which are unavoidable. Hence majority judgment is not a stainless voting system in social 
choice theory. But in many situations it gives fruitful results. Finally we want to say that 
voting system is a very complicated field and we have tried our best to make the majority 
judgment voting easier to the reader. 
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